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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[AUGUST

COURTS
Venue for Violations of Motor Vehicle Code. Section 2 of Chapter
393' states among other provisions that, with certain expressed exceptions, the "venue in all justice courts shall be before one of the two
nearest justices of the peace in incorporated cities and towns nearest
to the point the violation allegedly occurred." This has caused considerable concern (and also a loss of profit to country justices), especially since the attorney general has "requested" the state patrol to
comply with the provision. Similar language was found in the amended
law which was enacted in 1949.2

In 1953, a general venue provision relating to justices of the peace
was passed which provided that "the venue in all criminal actions shall
be brought before either of the nearest two justices of the peace to the
place where the alleged violation occurred."' Since chronologically the
1953 general act was subsequent to the 1949 motor vehicle provision,
the attorney general ruled that the 1953 act impliedly repealed the 1949
provision.' The state patrol continued its practice of citing traffic cases
before justices located outside of incorporated cities.
The reenactment of the venue provision in the motor vehicle code
makes it the latest word where traffic violations are involved, and hence
controlling.
One basic reason for laying the venue in incorporated cities is to
increase the likelihood that the judges will have had legal training.
Justices in cities of 5000 or more must be members of the bar.'
Requiring traffic cases to be tfied in incorporated cities has the disadvantage of bringing more cases into a court usually already overburdened with violations of municipal ordinances. It has the advantage,
however, of centralizing the place of trial; thus, citing patrolmen are
required to appear in fewer courts.
WILLIAM

E. LovE

Independent Municipal Courts. Chapter 220 of the session laws is
of interest because it creates a municipal court in Seattle independent
of the justice of the peace court system, with jurisdiction similar to that
exercised by justices of the peace and with exclusive original jurisdicIOther

sections of Chapter 393 are discussed under Criminal Law, infra, p. 201, 203.
2 RCW 46.52.100.
8 RCW 3.20.131.
4 OPINIONS OF THE ATTY. GEN. 1953-55-159.
5RCW 3.12.071.
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tion over violations of municipal ordinances. 6 The statute provides that
the court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior courts
and justices of the peace in civil and criminal matters as now provided
by law for justices of the peace, and it authorizes a judge of the court
to sit in preliminary hearings as a magistrate. In cases within the concurrent jurisdiction a change of venue to a justice of the peace may
be had in accordance with the provisions of RCW 3.20.100-110. Jurisdiction over violations of municipal ordinances is generally the same as
the jurisdiction of police judges established by RCW 35.22.
If the act becomes effective, judges will be elected in 1958 for four
year terms and in the meantime, police court judges will qualify as
judges of the court.' Thus, in the future the judges would not be
appointed from the justices of the peace as are police judges in other
cities of the first class.
It might be noted that section 26 of the statute provides that the
court may subpoena witnesses "as now authorized in superior courts
throughout the state." Apparently, the intention was to provide that

the power of subpoena in civil and criminal cases be the same as that
granted to the superior courts.. However, the addition of the phrase
"throughout the state" makes the section somewhat ambiguous when
civil cases are considered. The statute also bears other marks of
hurried enactment.
A variety of reasons could be urged to justify the creation of a
municipal court having jurisdiction beyond violation of -municipal
ordinances and staffed with judges free from any formal connection
with the justice of the peace system. In any event, the passage of this
act is a legislative precedent for the creation of similar courts in Washington cities of less than five hundred thousand inhabitants if such
courts are desired in the future. Other states have established municipal courts independent of justices of the peace. Going beyond the
present Washington statute some states have found it desirable and
expedient to abolish justice of the peace jurisdiction in cities where
such municipal courts have been created.
ROBERT MEISENHOLDER

6

The act refers to cities of the first class having more than five thousand inhabitants.
7At the present writing, the act has not become effective because of a temporary

restraining order entered by the Superior Court of King County. Constitutional and
other questions which may be involved in this proceeding are not discussed in this
review of the statute.

